Rep. Rick Larsen, WA-02, outlined his concerns about training and equipping Syrian opposition forces to fight against the terrorist group ISIL in a letter to President Obama. In the letter, Larsen also advocated that Congress consider a specific and separate law to authorize military operations against ISIL, rather than allowing the President to rely on the existing post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force.

Full text of the letter follows.

September 16, 2014

President Barack Obama

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama:

As Congress prepares to vote on the authorization to train and equip indigenous forces in Syria, I want to highlight lessons I have learned as a member of the House Armed Services Committee over the last 13 years our military has been in Afghanistan.  Additionally, I want to outline concerns about the Administration’s use of the 2001 and 2002 AUMF as the legal justification for this action.

Train and Equip

After 13 years of fighting in Afghanistan, our military has learned valuable lessons about creating an indigenous fighting force.  In 2002, the U.S. undertook the goal of establishing and training a 70,000-soldier Afghan National Army.  At present, the size of the forces trained by the U.S. in the Afghan national security apparatus is more than five times greater than the original estimate.  The conclusion is clear—to achieve military objectives, initial training estimates may be far too low.  This escalation has also led to increased costs.  In 2002, U.S. officials estimated the cost to train and equip Afghan forces would be $350 million per year.  A more current NATO estimate puts the annual budget at $4.1 billion.

The vetting process also presents serious challenges.  As the Administration trains and equips the moderate Syrian opposition, how can the vetting process ensure that individuals are moderate, Syrian, and truly opposition?  In Afghanistan, 144 members of the NATO coalition have been killed and 183 wounded in ‘green-on-blue’ attacks since January 1, 2008.  While vetting methods have improved since attacks peaked in 2012, U.S. military personnel are still at risk.  A green-on-blue attack killed Major General Harold Greene last month.  The vetting process remains imperfect. And it puts U.S. trainers in harm’s way and risks equipping ISIL sympathizers.

Even those who complete training may not remain active in the indigenous security force.  In Afghanistan, a recent SIGAR report found that NTM-A/CSTC-A estimated a 30 percent to 50 percent annual attrition rate.  To achieve a goal of 5,400 Syrians fighting against ISIL, many times more will have to be recruited to account for force growth, infiltrators, and attrition. 

Additionally, when compensating individual fighters, the Administration must take steps to choose an appropriate level and means of payment.  Undercompensating fighters for their service risks desertions, and not compensating in the appropriate method has the potential to encourage petty corruption. 

AUMF

My second major concern is the legislative authority cited by the Administration as the legal justification for the campaign against ISIL.  The 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to “prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States  by such nations, organizations, or persons.”  This straightforward provision has been to military action what Sections 215 and 702 of the USA PATRIOT Act were to domestic surveillance—expanded and exploited by consecutive administrations to conduct activities far beyond what Congress intended.

Using the post-September 11 AUMF to justify attacks against ISIL is a distortion of the law’s intent.  ISIL did not plan, authorize, commit or aid in those heinous attacks.  This military campaign would be on a more solid legal standing if it relied on different authorities. 

As President, you have the Article II authority as Commander in Chief to order a military strike to prevent an attack on the U.S.  Additionally, under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the President can engage the military in action for 60 days without an AUMF unless Congress enacts an AUMF, extends the 60 day period, or certifies that an additional 30 days are needed in order to withdraw forces. 

However, the strongest legal justification for action against ISIL would be a specific and separate AUMF, which explicitly defines the individuals, groups, geography, and timeline within its scope.  This would provide our military with the clarity and guidance needed to best combat ISIL.  It would also give Congress the opportunity to rewrite, reform, and limit the 2001 AUMF, consistent with your pledge at the National Defense University in 2013.

Thank you for leadership in these challenging times.  As you prepare to counter the grave threat posed by ISIL, I urge you to take advantage of the lessons that cost many lives and billions of dollars to learn in Afghanistan and Iraq.  It is also my hope that this action can be the impetus for a renewed focus on the legal justification for use of force to provide future presidents with clear, focused authority in the future.

Sincerely,

Rick Larsen

Member of Congress

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