Rep. Rick Larsen, WA-02, ranking member of the House Aviation Subcommittee, delivered the following statement today at the Subcommittee’s hearing on “Lessons Learned from the Boeing 787 Incidents.” The hearing webcast is available here: https://transportation.house.gov/hearing/lessons-learned-boeing-787-incidents. 

Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo, for calling today’s hearing to review lessons learned from the Boeing 787 incidents.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that we should start this hearing by acknowledging that we are in an incredibly safe period for U.S. commercial aviation. We have not had a fatal commercial passenger accident in the U.S. since 2009, and we owe a great deal of credit for that to the dedicated safety professionals at agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

Additionally, the Boeing Company has been a world leader in the airplane business for almost a century. It has maintained its leadership by making safety a priority.

The Boeing 787 pushes the technological envelope. The certification itself was an eight-year process. The 787’s lithium-ion batteries, like many of the aircraft’s design features, are a new and constantly evolving technology not specifically covered by existing FAA regulations.

We know the FAA worked with Boeing to develop Special Conditions that would ensure the safety of this new technology. The process for developing these Special Conditions was collaborative, rigorous and transparent. These conditions took over a year to develop, and were published in the Federal Register for public comment.

Nevertheless, we had two serious safety incidents involving Boeing 787 lithium-ion technology in roughly a week’s time. These incidents caused the FAA and other international regulators to ground the 787 for more than three months.

The grounding raises legitimate questions for the flying public about whether the certification process with the 787 worked as well as it should have.

In response to these two incidents, Boeing devoted more than 200,000 engineering hours to understand the cause of these incidents and develop technical solutions to prevent or mitigate any further incidents.

Likewise, the FAA stepped up its own involvement in the testing and analysis activities required to certify the new battery design.

As a result, the Boeing 787 modifications certified by the FAA have been completed, and all of the airplanes are now back in service.

Mr. Chairman, we both agree that safety is always this Subcommittee’s highest priority. With the 787 safely flying again, now is an appropriate time for this Subcommittee to review these incidents and glean lessons learned that could further improve aviation safety.

In April, the Government Accountability Office raised concerns before the Senate Commerce Committee that “FAA staff have not been able to keep pace with industry changes and, thus, may struggle to understand the aircraft or equipment they are tasked with certificating.” The NTSB’s independent investigation of the January 7 Japan Airlines 787 incident is exploring this key issue, and should be completed later this year. The FAA is conducting its own review of the Boeing 787’s certification process.

Looking forward, Congress must ensure that the FAA is adequately staffed and that the agency is positioned to understand and challenge assumptions put forward by manufacturers regarding new technologies.

I’m hoping to hear from FAA and Boeing today about how the special conditions for the 787 were developed, and whether they were strict enough. I also want to investigate whether the resources required to recertify the 787 were enough.

In February, I expressed concerns at this Subcommittee’s FAA reauthorization hearing that sequestration could negatively affect FAA certification activities. I would like to hear from Ms. Gilligan whether she believes that sequestration, budget cuts and hiring freezes are impairing the FAA’s ability to attract and retain technical competencies required to certify new technologies.

Also, I would like to hear about the FAA’s efforts to retain independent technical expertise from outside the agency when necessary to assist in the certification of new technologies.

Lastly, I hope that we’ll have time to investigate the lessons learned from this process, and how the FAA will certify aircraft with lithium ion batteries in the future.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.